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PERSONAL JURISDICTION
IN THE BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT:

A NEED FOR REFORM
Edward S. Adams*
Rachel E. Iverson**

Suppose Corporation X, a Minnesota computer corporation, files a petition to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code1 in the

United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota. Suppose
also that thirty-five days prior to this filing, Corporation X had paid Cor-

poration Y, a Canadian trucking corporation and one of its creditors,
$100,000 to haul goods to one of Corporation X's Canadian customers.
Conjecture that, immediately after Corporation X's Chapter 11 filing, the
debtor in possession2 of Corporation X3 commences an adversary proceeding4 against Corporation Y to recover the $100,000 as property of the
5
bankruptcy estate pursuant to Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which permits a debtor in possession to avoid a pre-petition transfer that
is a preference.6 A question then arises as to whether the United States
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of Center for Law and Business Studies
at University of Minnesota Law School; 1985 B.A. magna cum laude from Knox College,
Galesburg, Illinois; 1988 J.D. cum laude from University of Chicago Law School, Chicago,
Illinois.
** Associate Attorney at Rider, Bennett, Egan & Arundel in Minneapolis, Minnesota; 1992 B.A. magna cum laude from Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana; 1995
J.D. magna cum laude from University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330 (1994)).
2. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1994) (defining "debtor in possession" as "debtor except
when a person that has qualified under section 322 of this title is serving as trustee in the
case...").
3. Typically, the existing managers of a corporation are allowed to remain in control
of the reorganized company as the debtor in possession. Only under rare circumstances
will an outside party be appointed trustee of the debtor-corporation. See In re Sharon
Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1225-26 (3d Cir.) (holding that the appointment of an outside
trustee is the exception), later proceeding, 100 B.R. 767 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
4. An adversary proceeding is a form of litigation commenced in bankruptcy court
and governed by the Bankruptcy Rules. See BANKR. R. 7001-7087; see also 9 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ch. 7001 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1995).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994) (listing ways a trustee can avoid transferring property).
6. See id. § 547; see also Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the
Common Pool Analogy as Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy
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Bankruptcy Court in Minnesota has the authority to assert jurisdiction
over Corporation Y. If jurisdiction is within this court's dominion, it is
unclear whether the power derives from evaluating Corporation Y's aggregate contacts with the United States, or from analyzing Corporation
Y's minimum contacts with the state of Minnesota. This Article examines

the important quandary United States bankruptcy courts face when they
attempt to gain personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants in bankruptcy cases.
Jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases is idiosyncratic, due to its derivation.
The Bankruptcy Act provided that bankruptcy jurisdiction rested with
the federal district courts.7 Shortly after Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code, district courts began referring virtually all bankruptcy cases
to referees in bankruptcy.8 These referees soon became known as bank-

ruptcy judges, and district court judges would appoint them to six-year
terms. 9 This peculiar history has caused subject matter jurisdiction and

personal jurisdiction in bankruptcy law to evolve in a unique manner.'0

Case, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 352 n.42 (1993) (stating an avoidable preference may occur
upon a voluntary payment by the debtor, depending on the timing and financial picture of
the debtor).
7. ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY 900 (2d ed., 1989).
8. Id.
9. Id. A bankruptcy judge's finding of facts will only be set aside if clearly erroneous;
additionally, his or her orders are final. Id.
10. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 971 (1985) (discussing personal jurisdiction in bankruptcy courts);
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53-54, later proceeding, 459 U.S. 813 (1982). In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court invalidated the subject
matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts in non-core proceedings. See id. at 87. The
Northern Pipeline decision altered the jurisdictional capabilities of bankruptcy judges. Following Northern Pipeline, bankruptcy judges were not authorized to hear non-core proceedings, such as state law causes of action. Id. n.40. Bankruptcy judges were empowered
to hear only matters which "related to" the bankruptcy case. Id. at 85. Disagreement
exists on the question of whether Rule 7004(d) is consistent with due process in a case
involving partly bankruptcy and partly state law matters. Diamond Mortgage Corp. v.
Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1089 (1991). In the bankruptcy proceeding, no "minimum contacts" analysis is necessary, but for state law matters,
InternationalShoe's "minimum contacts" analysis is necessary. See id. at 1244-47. This
Article focuses exclusively on core proceedings and does not address the ramifications of a
plaintiff's attempt to assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in a non-core
proceeding. For more detailed information on this subject, see J.T. Moran Fin. Corp. v.
American Consolidated Fin. Corp., (In re J.T. Moran Fin. Corp.), 124 B.R. 931 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy Procedureand State-CreatedRights: The Lessons of
Gibbons and Marathon, Sup. Cr. REV. 25, 36-37 (Philip B. Kurland et al. eds., 1982); David
P. Currie, Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441
(1982).
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In bankruptcy, a special set of rules governs a defendant's amenability
to service of process."

Specifically, Rule 7004(d)' 2 dictates a bankruptcy

court's right to assert jurisdiction nationwide, and Rule 7004(e) 1 3 controls
service of process in foreign countries. The differences between the service of process rules governing bankruptcy cases and the procedural rules

governing other civil cases 14 create special problems of interpretation.' 5
In particular, the expansive grant of jurisdictional power that rule 7004(d)
delegates to bankruptcy courts has made it difficult for those courts to
apply a personal jurisdiction analysis to foreign defendants.

As nationwide contact is the minimal requirement to establish jurisdiction under Rule 7004(d) over domestic defendants, 6 the minimum contacts test 17 becomes redundant when applied to a United States
resident."R When a foreign defendant is involved, however, ambiguity appears when determining the correct application of the Bankruptcy Rules'
11. BANKR. R. 7004; see also 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 4, at ch. 7004
12. Rule 7004(d) states: "Nationwide Service of Process[:] The summons and complaint and all other process except a subpoena may be served anywhere in the United
States." BANKR. R. 7004(d).
13. The Rule states:
Service on Debtor and'Others in Foreign Country[:] The summons and complaint
and all other process except a subpoena may be served as provided in Rule
4(d)(1) and (d)(3) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] in a foreign country
(A) on the debtor, any person required to perform the duties of a debtor, any
general partner of a partnership debtor, or any attorney who is a party to a transaction subject to examination under Rule 2017; or (B) on any party to an adversary proceeding to determine or protect rights in property in the custody of the
court; or (C) on any person whenever such service is authorized by a federal or
state law referred to in Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) or (e) [of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure].
BANKR. R. 7004(e).
14. The Bankruptcy Rules state, in effect, that the parallel provision under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is the version of Rule 4 that was in effect on January 1, 1990. See
BANKR. R. 7004(g); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 4. In 1993, Congress substantially revised Rule
4.
15. See, e.g., Diamond Mortgage Corp. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233, 1242-43 (7th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1089 (1991); Nordberg v. Granfinanciera, S.A. (In re Chase &
Sandborn Corp.), 835 F.2d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir.) (declaring that "[f]ederal Bankruptcy
Rule 7004(d) provides for nationwide service of process and thus is the statutory basis for
personal jurisdiction . . . not Florida's long-arm statute"), cert. granted, 486 U.S. 1054
(1988), and rev'd, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
16. See BANKR. R. 7004(d); see also Diamond Mortgage, 913 F.2d at 1244 (explaining
that a defendant's contact with a state is irrelevant when the United States is exercising
power over the defendant).
17. The "minimum contacts" test is set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
18. See DiamondMortgage, 913 F.2d at 1244. But see Granfinanciera,835 F.2d at 1344
n.8 (discussing the lack of consensus among courts as to whether minimum contacts analysis is necessary where jurisdiction was obtained over a domestic defendant through nationwide service of process).
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jurisdictional provisions. This ambiguity causes two principle questions
to arise. Should a court revert to the state long-arm provisions, thereby
allowing a foreign defendant to evade the jurisdictional reach of the
United States bankruptcy courts more easily than a domestic defendant?
Are the constitutional standards established in InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington1 9 violated when a bankruptcy court "aggregates" a foreign
defendant's contacts with the United States to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction?
Some courts have refused to assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants
because the defendant lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state,"° while other courts have used minimum aggregate contacts with
the United States to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction.2' Some
courts have viewed Rule 7004(d)'s clear and expansive language as a vehicle to gain jurisdiction over foreign defendants who are not subject to
jurisdiction on state contacts alone.2 2 The broad nature of Rule 7004(d)
has confounded Rule 7004(e)'s applicability, by offering judges a window
of opportunity to expand their jurisdictional boundaries. In short, courts
have failed to resolve the interpretational difficulties surrounding service
of process under Rule 7004(e) in a uniform manner. 23 These interpretive
difficulties are compounded by the recent amendments to Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP 4), which now provides that:
(1) Service of a summons or filing a waiver of service is effective
to establish jurisdiction over the person of a defendant .... (2)
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States, serving a summons or filing a
waiver of service is also effective, with respect to claims arising
under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the
19. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring defendants to possess "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice' ") (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
20. See Lone Star Indus. v. Compania Naviera Perez Companc (In re New York Trap
Rock Corp.), 155 B.R. 871,885-88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 160 B.R. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1993),
and aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 42 F.3d 747 (2d Cir. 1994).
21. See Ace Pecan Co. v. Granadex Int'l Ltd. (In re Ace Pecan Co.), 143 B.R. 696,
699-701 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
22. Id. at 701 (deriving a "broad authority" to assert jurisdiction from congressional
intent evident in the Bankruptcy Rules).
23. See, e.g., Nordberg v. Granfinanciera, S.A. (In re Chase & Sandborn Corp.), 835
F.2d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir.) (ignoring Rule 7004(e) and asserting jurisdiction through Rule
7004(d) and FRCP 4(e)), cert. granted, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988), and rev'd, 492 U.S. 33 (1989);
In re New York Trap Rock Corp., 155 B.R. at 887 (reading Rule 7004(e) and FRCP 4 as
only allowing jurisdiction if the state long-arm statute is satisfied).
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person of any defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts of general jurisdiction of any state.24
This Article analyzes and evaluates the debate concerning a bankruptcy court's ability to assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign entity.
Additionally, this Article advocates that the Bankruptcy Rules be
amended to conform to the new federal long-arm statute, FRCP 4. More
specifically, this Article asserts and demonstrates that: (1) the current status of the law in bankruptcy cases regarding personal jurisdiction is uncertain; (2) prior to the 1993 amendments to FRCP 4, some courts
improperly broadened the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts by allowing
them to assert power over defendants by focusing on a defendant's nationwide contacts as opposed to contacts with the forum state; and (3) in
light of the new expansion of FRCP 4, Congress should enact a parallel
version of the federal long-arm statute in Rule 7004(e).
Part I of this Article outlines the Supreme Court's standard on personal jurisdiction, thereby exploring the nature of service of process and
personal jurisdiction, both in general civil litigation and in bankruptcy
litigation. Part II of this Article analyzes and distinguishes the approaches courts have utilized in assessing whether bankruptcy courts may
use aggregate nationwide contacts when asserting jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Finally, Part III of this Article recommends that Rule
7004 be updated to reflect changes in the amended version of FRCP 4.
By enacting the federal long-arm statute in FRCP 4(k)(2), Congress
closed a loophole through which foreign defendants were permitted to
conduct business in the United States while evading legal responsibility
for their actions in the United States. As a result, the Bankruptcy Rules
should follow the trend the 1993 amendments to FRCP 4 began by closing this parallel loophole in the bankruptcy context. Explicit expansion
of Rule 7004(e)'s scope, to encompass foreign defendants as amenable to
service under a federal long-arm statute, would prevent the existing judicial error in interpretation from continuing.

I.

SERVICE OF PROCESS

Traditionally, service of process upon a defendant has been required
before a case could commence.25 Rendering service upon a defendant
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k).

25. Service of process provides a means by which courts gain jurisdiction over parties.
E.g., Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1986); see
also DAVID W. LOUISELL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE
STATE AND FEDERAL 440, 458-464 (6th ed. 1989) (explaining service of process).
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does not, however, necessarily confer jurisdiction over that defendant.2 6
A court must have in personam27 jurisdiction over the defendant for a
proceeding to be legitimate. 28 As the United States Supreme Court made
clear in Omni CapitalInternational,Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,29 a court
may not assert its power arbitrarily over an unwilling defendant:
"[S]ervice of summons is the procedure by which a court having

venue and jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit asserts
jurisdiction over the person of the party served." Thus, before a

court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, there
must be more than notice to the defendant and a constitutionally sufficient relationship between the defendant and the forum. There also must be a basis for the defendant's amenability
to service of summons. Absent consent, this means there must

be authorization for service of summons on the defendant.3"
Because courts must have a basis to assert jurisdiction, questions of per-

sonal jurisdiction often become tangled in an analysis of whether the defendant has a constitutionally sufficient relationship with the forum. 31 In
some instances, the ability to assert personal jurisdiction is clear. Traditionally, a court obtains personal jurisdiction over the defendant by the
32
defendant's presence within the particular state where the court sits.

26. See Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) (requiring, for federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction, a "constitutionally sufficient relationship between the defendant and the forum" in addition to a basis for service of
summons).
27. An action against a person is defined as an "[aIction seeking judgment against a
person involving his personal rights and based on jurisdiction of his person, as distinguished from a judgment against property .... " BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 791 (6th ed.
1990).
28. Noxon Chem. Prod. Co., Inc. v. Leckie, 39 F.2d 318, 319-20 (3d Cir.) (declaring
that jurisdiction over the person is necessary for the court to have power to decide the
action), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 841 (1930).
29. 484 U.S. 97 (1987).
30. Id. at 104 (citation omitted). The Court justified its ability to create a constitutional standard for personal jurisdiction by citing the Due Process Clause. Id. The Court
has established this standard virtually without exception under the Due Process Clause.
See William M. Richman, UnderstandingPersonalJurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 60610 (1993) (discussing the constitutional source of personal jurisdiction).
31. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)
(finding personal jurisdiction lacking because "[p]etitioners carr[ied] on no activity whatsoever" in the forum state); Wichita Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Landmark Group, Inc., 657 F.
Supp. 1182, 1194 (D. Kan.) (requiring both a statutory analysis and a due process analysis
where issues of personal jurisdiction exist), later proceeding, 674 F. Supp. 321 (D. Kan.
1987).
32. E.g., Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 1930).
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Also, a defendant's voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction constitutes a waiver of the right to object to jurisdiction.3 3
In more difficult cases, the revolutionary test for determining the constitutional sufficiency of a defendant's relationship with a forum, and
thereby a court's ability to assert personal jurisdiction over that defendant, derives from InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.34 In International

Shoe, the Court established the "minimum contacts" standard for resolving whether personal jurisdiction exists.3 5 Under this standard, a non-

resident defendant is amenable to service of process only if the defendant
has certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state 36 such that the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant does not violate "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. 3 7
The Court further developed the personal jurisdiction test into a distinct two-part inquiry in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz .3 First, and

39
most importantly, the Court asserted that an analysis of the defendant's

connections with the forum state should be done.4" To satisfy the initial
half of the test, the defendant must have minimum contacts with the state
where the court sits.4 1 More specifically, to measure the defendant's contacts adequately, a court must distinguish between general and specific
33. This submission may occur in the form of filing an answer to a plaintiff's complaint, appearing generally before the court, or submitting any other motion or proceeding
to the power of the court. See Pond v. Simpson, 146 N.E. 684, 684-85 (Mass. 1925) (discussing the concepts of general and specific appearances); McNaughton v. Broach, 260
N.Y.S. 100, 104-05 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932) (discussing non-residents who refuse to consent
to jurisdiction); Mississippi Valley Dev. Corp. v. Colonial Enter., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 760, 76364 (Minn. 1974) (discussing positive actions to obtain relief).
34. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
35. Id. at 316-19.
36. Id. at 316 (requiring minimum contacts with the forum state to satisfy the requirements of due process).
37. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
38. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
39. Only the defendant's contacts need to be evaluated. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984), later proceeding, 815 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1987). The
plaintiff's contacts with the forum are generally irrelevant. Id. at 779. See also Richman,
supra note 30, at 618-21 (summarizing relevant case law and concluding that only a defendant's contacts are considered in a personal jurisdiction issue).
40. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. The first prong of the personal jurisdiction analysis
has typically been deemed the most important aspect of the inquiry. By assuring that a
defendant has requisite minimum contacts with the forum, the subsequent fairness portion
of the test is often satisfied. Cf Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,
113-16 (1987) (concluding assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would offend notions of fair play and substantial justice, notwithstanding the defendant's sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum state).
41. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 (reaffirming that the Constitution requires the defendant to have minimum contacts with the forum state for jurisdiction to be warranted).
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jurisdiction. 4 2 General jurisdiction exists when a defendant has substan-

tial and numerous contacts with the forum state. If a defendant has adequate contacts to support general jurisdiction, then inquiry under the first
prong of the test is complete. 43 If a defendant has limited contact with
the forum state, but the cause of action brought by the plaintiff arises out
of, or relates to these contacts, then the defendant may be required to
face suit in the forum based on those specific contacts. 4

Second, the opinion maintained that a court should assess the fairness
of asserting jurisdiction in a particular situation.4 5 In measuring the "fair-

ness" prong of the personal jurisdiction test, 46 a court may refuse to assert personal jurisdiction, even when the defendant has accrued the
requisite minimum contacts.4 7 Additionally, the factors weighing into the

fairness analysis may differ slightly where the defendant is a resident of a
foreign country.48
The constitutional standard for personal jurisdiction described in International Shoe is effected principally through state long-arm statutes.4 9
Each state's statute varies in its wording and reach. 50 While some states

have enacted long-arm statutes that extend to the constitutional limit ,'
42. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8, n.9
(1984).
43. Id. at 414 n.9. The Helicopteros Court did not find general jurisdiction over the
defendant in Texas, despite the defendants use of a Texas corporation for helicopter transportation, purchase of materials in Texas, and employment of a Texas company to train its
pilots. Id. at 410-11.
44. Id. at 414.
45. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; see also Richman, supra note 30, at 601 (discussing the fact-specific nature of personal jurisdiction inquiries).
46. "Fairness" can be measured by evaluating an amorphous set of factors including:
the forum's interest in adjudicating the claim, the plaintiff's need to litigate in a particular
forum, and the burden on the defendant. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77. See Richman,
supra note 30, at 626; Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying "Fair Play and SubstantialJustice":
How the Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standardfor PersonalJurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 441, 444 (1991) (discussing the Asahi Court's application of the fairness
standard).
47. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (holding
that California courts could not assert personal jurisdiction absent a more compelling
showing of fairness).
48. Richman, supra note 30, at 627-28 n.179 (highlighting differences in asserting personal jurisdiction over domestic and alien defendants); Abramson, supra note 46, at 465
(stating that courts recognize the necessity of a different analysis when a foreign defendant
is challenging jurisdiction).
49. See Richman, supra note 30, at 638-39.
50. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201 (West 1991) with KAN. STAT. ANN, § 60-

308(b) (1983 & Supp. 1993) (listing a number of acts, that if engaged in, will result in
jurisdiction arising).
51.

See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) (allowing the exercise of

jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsistent with" the state or United States Constitution).
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others have enacted more limited long-arm statutes. 52 Consequently,
although a defendant may be served with process constitutionally if the
InternationalShoe test is satisfied, some states require more substantial
contacts before their courts will assert jurisdiction. International Shoe
enunciated merely the baseline requirements for a court to assert personal jurisdiction.53
Prior to the 1993 amendments to FRCP 4, the minimum contacts test
was applied to foreign defendants in the same manner as it was applied to
domestic residents.54 As a result, foreign defendants could evade a
court's jurisdiction if they did not satisfy the minimum contacts requirement under the applicable state long-arm statute.55 To assure foreign entities would be subject to suit in the United States, Congress amended
FRCP 4 to include a federal long-arm statute.5 6 Pursuant to this rule, in a
federal claim, if a foreign entity lacks sufficient contacts with an individual state, but has accrued sufficient contacts with the United States as a
whole, then a court within the United States can assert personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant. In short, the provision becomes operative when a "defendant has had contacts with the nation as a whole
sufficient to support jurisdiction along the lines of a 'long arm' inquiry."57
Typically, in bankruptcy proceedings, courts have not had to engage in
the International Shoe analysis to assert personal jurisdiction over
domestic defendants because Rule 7004(d) permits nationwide service of
process, 58 effective upon any defendant anywhere in the United
52. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (1982 & Supp. 1995) (listing specific instances
when jurisdiction will exist); MD. CODE ANN. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 6-103 (1995) (listing
similar items); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 301, 302 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1995).
53. See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (stating that the
Court's "boundary line" should not be applied mechanically).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 4, 28 U.S.C.A. cmt C4-35 (West 1995) [hereinafter Comment C435.] Commentators, however, have noted that asserting personal jurisdiction over foreign
defendants requires a more detailed analysis of the two-pronged contacts and fairness test.
Differences in legal systems and additional travel costs can impose a greater burden in
asserting jurisdiction over foreign defendants than on domestic defendants. Because a foreign country's legal system may be less sympathetic to plaintiffs, a plaintiff that is denied
relief in the United States will often have no alternative remedy; therefore, a court's refusal to assert jurisdiction can have serious consequences. See Richman, supra note 30, at
628 n.179.
55. See Richman, supra note 30, at 628 n.179.
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
57. Comment C4-35, supra note 54.
58. See GEX Kentucky, Inc. v. Wolf Creek Collieries Co. (In re GEX Kentucky, Inc.),
85 B.R. 431, 434 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (stating that bankruptcy courts are not required
to apply the minimum contacts test because they have automatic jurisdiction in matters
arising in bankruptcy), later proceeding, 100 B.R. 887 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); McGraw v.
Allen (In re Bell & Beckwith), 41 B.R. 697, 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984), later proceeding,
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States. 9 Thus, the minimum contacts theory, upon which personal jurisdiction is usually based, is inapplicable.6" In order for a bankruptcy court
to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, a summons simply must have

been served upon the defendant properly,61 and the proceeding must be
related to a bankruptcy matter.62 A court may then obtain jurisdiction

over the defendant if there is a significant connection between the defendant and the court. 63 Importantly, when the matter is a core proceeding,' any domestic person may be served without the aid of a long-arm

statute.65
The ability to serve process anywhere in the United States under Rule
7004(d) 66 allows the trustee or the debtor in possession to consolidate all

litigation regarding the assets of the debtor.6 7 Because of an overriding
intent to create a comprehensive, uniform treatment of bankruptcy issues
in the Bankruptcy Code, Congress placed no geographical limits on bankruptcy related service of process. 68 By authorizing nationwide service of
process, Congress alleviated the need for each bankruptcy court to evaluate the propriety of service of process in domestic cases. Rule 7004(d)
restricts, however, the nationwide service of process capability to the
United States. The term United States is used commonly to refer to any
44 B.R. 656 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In re Schack Glass Indus. Co., Inc., 20 B.R. 967, 970
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
59. The precise meaning of "United States" is defined neither in the Bankruptcy Code
nor in the Bankruptcy Rules. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 151, the definition governing the
United States District Courts states that "United States" typically means every jurisdiction
in which a district court is located. See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 4,
7004.06 at 7004-38.
60. See GEX Kentucky, 85 B.R. at 434.
61. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987)
("'[S]ervice of summons is the procedure by which a court having venue and jurisdiction
of the subject matter of the suit asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party served.' ")
(quoting Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S 438, 444-45 (1946)).
62. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,74, later
proceeding, 459 U.S. 813 (1982).
63. Omni Capital, 484 U.S. at 104.
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1988) (listing some of the matters constituting core proceedings). A bankruptcy judge has the authority to hear and determine "all core proceedings arising under" the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 157(b)(1).
65. BANKR. R. 7004(d).
66. See id.
67. See Jeffrey T. Ferriell, The Perilsof Nationwide Service of Process in a Bankruptcy
Context, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1199, 1202 (1991) (discussing that section 1409 of the
Federal Judicial Code permits most ligation in a bankruptcy case to be heard in the forum
where the petition was filed).
68. BANKR. R. 7004(d) (authorizing nationwide service of process); see also 9 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 4, J 7004.06.
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jurisdiction in which a district court is located.6 9 Courts have denied chal7
lenges to Rule 7004(d)'s broad grant to national personal jurisdiction 1
because venue and abstention provisions protect defendants from having
to endure distant litigation.7t
II.

THE PROBLEM OF FOREIGN DEFENDANTS

An important jurisdictional difficulty arises when a foreign entity is in-

volved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Rule 7004(e) governs service of process upon a foreign entity and describes several circumstances under
which such service is permissible.7 2 Unlike Rule 7004(d), however, the
rule for foreign service does not permit universal service upon any de-

fendant notwithstanding their residence. Explicitly, Rule 7004(e) allows
service on a foreign entity in only a few limited circumstances: (1) upon
the debtor or a related person;73 (2) upon a party to an adversary proceeding, if the court is in possession of some disputed property;74 or (3) if
75 Rule
a particular federal or state statute authorizes the service.
7004(e)'s indication that nationwide amenability to service was not intended to be imposed upon foreign defendants has led courts on widely
divergent tracks of analysis in determining permissible service of process.
Some courts have used their state's long-arm statute in conjunction with
76
the InternationalShoe test to determine amenability to service. Other
courts have examined the defendant's minimum aggregate contacts with
7 7 The 1993
the United States to find a basis for personal jurisdiction.
amendments to FRCP 4 further complicated this issue, because the Bankruptcy Rules were not changed to parallel the new rule 4. Accordingly, it
is uncertain whether bankruptcy courts should expand their ability to
69. See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 4,

7004.06 (stating that "United

States" includes Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands).
70. Teitelbaum v. Choquette & Co., Inc., (In re Outlet Department Stores, Inc.), 82
B.R. 694, 697-99 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (upholding the constitutionality of Rule 7004(d));
see also Ferriell, supra note 67, at 1204.
71. Teitelbaum, 82 B.R. at 699; see also BANKR. R. 9030 (providing that the Bankruptcy Rules do not limit or extend the venue rules governing bankruptcy courts).
72. BANKR. R. 7004(e) (allowing service upon the debtor, upon any party in order to
determine or protect property rights, and upon any person if authorized by statute).
73. BANKR. R. 7004(e)(A).
74. BANKR. R. 7004(e)(B).
75. BANKR. R. 7004(e)(C).
76. See, e.g., Lone Star Indus. v. Compania Naviera Perez Companc (In re New York
Trap Rock Corp.), 155 B.R. 871, 887-89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (applying New York's long-arm
statute and finding insufficient contacts to assert jurisdiction), aff'd, 160 B.R. 876
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), and aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 42 F.3d 747 (2d Cir. 1994).
77. See Ace Pecan Co., Inc. v. Granadex Int'l, Ltd. (In re Ace Pecan Co.), 143 B.R.
696, 701 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1992) (finding sufficient contacts with the United States to justify
jurisdiction).
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reach foreign defendants to mirror the changes to FRCP 4 without statutory authorization."8
Rule 7004(e) incorporates the service requirements delineated in
FRCP 4(d)(1) and (d)(3),79 which describe three specific instances where
service upon a foreign entity is permissible.8" Most disputes arise from

Rule 7004(e)(C), which "permits service of process upon a foreign entity
if authorized by a federal or state statute referred to in FRCP
4(c)(2)(C)(i) or 4(e). 8 1 FRCP 4(c)(2)(C)(i) permits service on an out-ofstate defendant pursuant to state law-in other words, the long-arm statute of the state in which the federal court sits. 82 Accordingly, a court may
assert personal jurisdiction over any person, including foreign entities, fitting within the confines of the applicable state long-arm provision.8 3
FRCP 4(e), in turn, provides courts with the ability to assert personal
jurisdiction over defendants pursuant to a statute or order.' Periodically, special statutes have been enacted to effect nationwide service upon

defendants, notwithstanding the typical constitutional "minimum contacts" restraints.8 5 Under these specific circumstances, bankruptcy courts
may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants by virtue of Rule
7004(e)(C).8 6
Notwithstanding the existence of Rule 7004(e)(C), canons of statutory
construction indicate a broad interpretation of Rule 7004(e) is inappropriate. Congress had the ability to enact a broad provision, as evidenced
by 7004(d), but failed to do so under Rule 7004(e). As the concept of
78. Cf.Levant Line, S.A. v. Marine Enter. Corp. (In re Levant Line, S.A.), 166 B.R.
221, 233 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (explaining that the new FRCP 4 arguably permits worldwide service of process).
79. BANKR. R. 7004(g) (stating that the subdivisions of Rule 4 in effect on January 1,
1990, not the 1993 amendments, are the applicable provisions). Any subsequent amendments to the rule should have no effect until the Bankruptcy Rules are specifically
amended. See BANKR. R. 7004(g) advisory committee's notes.
80. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
81. See BANKR. R. 7004(e)(C).
82. Lone Star Indus. v. Compania Naviera Perez Companc (In re New York Trap
Rock Corp.), 155 B.R. 871, 887 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), (applying New York's long-arm statute
because no federal statute, including the Bankruptcy Code, permitted service on the defendant); aff'd, 160 B.R. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), and aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 42 F.3d
747 (2d Cir. 1994).
83. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS
ON BANKRUPTCY 1254 (2d ed.1990).
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
85. See Marsh v. Kitchen, 480 F.2d 1270, 1273 n.8 (2d Cir. 1973) (explaining that Congress has the authority to enact broad process of service); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v.
Agricultural Coop. Ass'n, 34 F.R.D. 497, 498 (S.D. Iowa 1964) (stating that Congress may
enact laws permitting service of process across state lines).
86. Cf.Agricultural Coop Ass'n, 34 F.R.D. at 498 (discussing when process may be
served).
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expressio unius8 7 suggests, the fact that Congress enacted broad service

provisions in 7004(d), but did not do the same in 7004(e), indicates that
the omission was intentional.88 Accordingly, Rules 7004(d) and (e)
should not be read together to form a broad interpretation. If we assume
Congress did not intend duplicative provisions, it would be an error to
read the two provisions together. Additionally, the fact that Congress
enacted a rule addressing the procedure for service upon a foreign entity
further indicates that Rule 7004(e) is the sole applicable provision regarding foreign service. Furthermore, extending a bankruptcy court's reach
based upon a grant of power in Rule 7004(d), ignores the enactment of
Rule 7004(e). 89 Finally, the Bankruptcy Code as a whole suggests it
should not be read in isolation, but rather each section should be read in
context with the others. As the Supreme Court noted in Kokoszka v.
Belford,9 ° the Court will interpret a particular clause in connection with
the entire statute so that its construction reflects the will of the legislature. 9' Congress enacted all of the provisions as one, intending each to
supply a specific meaning to the others. 92
For similar reasons, Rule 7004(d) cannot be construed as a "statute"
within the meaning of FRCP 4(e). 93 The word "statute" refers to an explicit grant of power, as exemplified in the RICO or Securities Acts' statutes.9 4 Although including "rules" within the meaning of "statute" may
not seem overzealous, allowing a nationwide service of process rule
would distort the meaning of Rule 7004(e). Congress carefully enumer87. "The maxim 'expressio [or inclusio] unius est exclusio alterius' means 'inclusion of
one thing indicates exclusion of the other.' . . . [T]he enumeration of certain things in a
statute suggests that the legislature had no intent of including things not listed or embraced." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 638 (2d. ed. 1995).
88. See Tate v. Ogg, 195 S.E. 496, 499 (Va. 1938) (declaring that the maxim expressio
unius applies to statutes); see also ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 87, at 638 (explaining

that expressio unius is a notion of negative implication).
89. See supra note 87 (discussing the maxim).
90. 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
91. Id. at 650 (stating that the Court will look at the entire statute, including the objects and policies behind it).
92. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 87, at 643 (noting that legislatures enact entire
statutes, without differentiating the weight to be accorded to specific sections).
93. Lone Star Indus. v. Compania Naviera Perez Companc (In re New York Trap
Rock Corp.), 155 B.R. 871, 887 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (finding that no federal statute, including Rule 7004(d), authorized jurisdiction over the defendant), aff'd, 160 B.R. 876
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), and aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 42 F.3d 747 (2d Cir. 1994); Old Electric, Inc. v. RCP, Inc. (In re Old Electric Inc.), 142 B.R. 189, 190-91 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1992) (finding it "odd" to try to qualify Rule 7004(d) as a statute under FRCP 4(e)).
94. Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp., Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing
RICO), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 332 (7th
Cir. 1979) (discussing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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ated the circumstances under which a foreign defendant could be amenable to process. This careful construction of Rule 7004(e) would seem to
preclude the subsequent incorporation of Rule 7004(d). Furthermore, in
Old Electric, Inc. v. RCP, Inc., (In re Old Electric Inc.),95 the bankruptcy
court for the Northern District of Ohio noted the incongruity of stringing
these provisions together. The court avoided such a result by applying
ordinary meanings to the words "statute" and "order." 96 Thus, Rule
7004(d) should not be bootstrapped onto Rule 7004(e) by defining Rule
7004(d) as a federal statute.
Many of the decisions addressing the scope of personal jurisdiction in
the Rule 7004(e) context, however, have been misplaced. For example, in
Nordberg v. GranfinancieraS.A. (In re Chase & Sandborn)97 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Rule 7004(d)
constitutes a "statute" within the meaning of FRCP 4.98 Consequently,
the defendants' contacts with the United States, not with the forum state,
composed the basis for determining personal jurisdiction. 99 The court,
relying on the defendants' contacts with the United States, stated that the
defendant should be subject to nationwide service of process-implying
that the Florida long-arm statute was irrelevant. 10 0 The court glossed
over the question of whether a rule constitutes a statute, and thereby
failed to recognize the depth of the personal jurisdiction problem. Moreover, the court disregarded the fact that the bankruptcy rule provisions
for foreign defendants were separated from the nationwide service of
process provision. The court simply intertwined the two rules in order to
create an all-encompassing worldwide service provision.
Likewise, in Ace Pecan Co., Inc. v. Granadex InternationalLtd. (In re
Ace Pecan Co.)101 the court was anxious to create a broad standard for
amenability to service, and misconstrued Rule 7004(e) despite concluding
that the term "statute" could not apply to Rule 7004(d).10 2 The bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Illinois correctly noted that the
95. 142 B.R. 189 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
96. Id. at 192. The court stated it would be a strained interpretation to include "rule"
within "statute." Id.
97. 835 F.2d 1341,1344, 1348 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988), and rev'd,
492 U.S. 33 (1989). While more widely recognized for its impact upon the right to a jury
trial in a bankruptcy proceeding, this decision does briefly discuss jurisdiction. Id.
98. Id. at 1344. The court maintained that it would be ignoring the first sentence of
FRCP 4(e) to not read Rule 7004(d) as a statute. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 143 B.R. 696 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
102. Id. at 698-99. If the court had concluded that Rule 7004(e) was a statute, under
FRCP 4(e), it could have authorized service on foreign defendants. See id. But see FED. R.
Civ. P. 4(f) (amending the rules for service on those in foreign countries).
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minimum contacts requirement, upon which personal jurisdiction is generally founded, was inapplicable in federal question bankruptcy proceedings because Rule 7004(d) authorizes nationwide service. 103 The basis for

the court's determination was a series of prior cases involving domestic
disputes" ° that had acknowledged readily that the International Shoe

minimum contacts test was merely an academic pursuit when the defendant was a resident of the United States.' 0 5 For instance, in Hirsch v.
Vlerbaum (In re Colonial Realty Company), °6 the defendant, an Ohio
resident, claimed that a Connecticut bankruptcy court could not legitimately exercise personal jurisdiction over him because he lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state.' 7 The court rejected this argument
based on Rule 7004(d), stating: "The defendant admits that he is a resident of Ohio .... Therefore, there can be no question that the defendant
has sufficient contacts with the United States for a federal court constitutionally to exercise personal jurisdiction over him."'0 8
Next, the Ace Pecan court recognized that when the defendant resides
in a foreign country, a different issue is presented, and the proper analysis
should focus on Rule 7004(e).' 0 9 After concluding that Rule 7004(d) was
inapplicable, the court analyzed Rule 7004(e) to determine the bounda103. In re Ace Pecan, 143 B.R. at 698 (noting that a majority of the courts find the
minimum contacts test inapplicable).
104. Id. (citing Diamond Mortgage Corp. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1089 (1991)); Teitelbaum v. Choquette & Co., Inc., (In re Outlet
Dept. Stores, Inc.), 82 B.R. 694 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); GEX Kentucky, Inc. v. Wolf
Creek Collieries Co. (In re GEX Kentucky, Inc.), 85 B.R. 431, 434 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1987).
105. Lone Star Indus. v. Compania Naviera Perez Companc (In re New York Trap
Rock Corp.), 155 B.R. 871, 889 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (stating "where a federal statute provides for nationwide service of process, the question of whether a domestic corporation,
for example, is amenable to service is academic"), aff'd, 160 B.R. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), and
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 42 F.3d 747 (2d Cir. 1994).
106. 163 B.R. 431 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
107. Id. at 432.
108. Id. at 433 (citing Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979)). The
defendant also argued that the court lacked a statutory basis to assert jurisdiction. Id. The
court disagreed, ruling Rule 7004 was a valid statutory basis. Id. See Diamond Mortgage
Corp. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1089 (1991). The
court stated:
[W]hether there exist[s] sufficient minimum contacts between the attorneys and
the State of Illinois has no bearing upon whether the United States may exercise
its power over the attorneys pursuant to its federal question jurisdiction. Certainly, the attorneys have sufficient contacts with the United States to be subject
to the district court's in personam jurisdiction.
Id.
109. Ace Pecan Co., Inc. v. Grandex Int'l Ltd. (In re Ace Pecan Co., Inc.), 143 B.R. 696,
698 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (explaining that Rule 7004(d) is limited to domestic service of
process).

1096

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 44:1081

ries of service upon a foreign defendant. 110 The court ignored the International Shoe minimum contacts test, and asserted that "when a federal
court is exercising jurisdiction over an alien defendant on a federal law
claim, the contacts should be measured with the United States as a
whole."" ' Thus, rather than solely relying upon state contacts, the court
focused on nationwide contacts as a basis for asserting personal
jurisdiction.' 2
While unique in the bankruptcy context, the Ace Pecan analysis mirrors
the parameters of other federal legislation. Under RICO" 3 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4 for example, Congress has enacted specific
provisions permitting nationwide service." i While admitting that the aggregate contacts test was most often used only upon explicit authorization
by other federal statutes, 16 the Ace Pecan court enunciated several rationales for applying the aggregate contacts rule in a bankruptcy proceeding. 17 First, because the issues concerned federal law, neither state
sovereignty nor state policy would be impinged upon federally." 8 Second, the court was concerned about the possibility of foreign corporations
110. Id.
111. Id. at 700 (citing Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985)). Although the court used Max Daetwyler to support its aggregate contacts contention, it failed to realize that Max Daetwyler determined that only
where a federal statute authorizes nationwide service of process may the aggregate contacts test be used. Max Daetwyler, 762 F.2d at 297. In the absence of such a statute, the
Max Daetwyler court indicated that the forum state's long-arm statute should be used. See
id. at 295.
112. Ace Pecan, 143 B.R. at 700 (declaring that the aggregate contacts analysis includes
the International Shoe test, but applies to the entire United States).
113. See Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating
that RICO's grant of nationwide service does not impact upon the Due Process Clause),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988).
114. See Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 332-33 (7th Cir. 1979) (upholding the
validity of nationwide service of process under § 27 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78(u) (1994) (detailing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934's provisions regarding nationwide service); 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1994) (showing the RICO provisions
regarding service of process).
116. Ace Pecan, 143 B.R. at 700; see, e.g., First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp.,
209 F. Supp. 730, 736 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) (claiming "that a sovereignty has personal jurisdiction over any defendant within its territorial limits"); Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762
F.2d 290, 293-94 (3d Cir.) (stating that where it is a question of personal jurisdiction regarding federal rights, national contacts is the focus), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985);
Fitzsimmons, 589 F.2d at 332 (allowing national service of process upon a defendant pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because of sufficient national contacts); Lisak,
834 F.2d at 671-72, (claiming that a federal court has jurisdiction in a federal question case,
such as under federal racketeering laws, because contact at a national level is sufficient for
the court to exercise the power of the United States).
117. Ace Pecan, 143 B.R. at 700.
118. Id.
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violating American laws without repercussion, simply due to the lack of
sufficient contacts to warrant suit in a particular forum state. 119 Third,
citing dicta from United Rope Distributorsv. Seatriumph Marine Corp.,120
the court claimed that unlike diversity jurisdiction, 12 ' where a court has
federal question jurisdiction, 22 it need not " 'absorb the 'whole law' of
the state .. . ,,12 Next, the court determined that "It]he Bankruptcy
Code requires uniformity in its enforcement," making national contacts a
more appropriate analytical tool because of the concern for national uniformity. 1 24 Lastly, the Ace Pecan court viewed Rule 7004(d), which allows nationwide service of process, as evidence of Congress' intent to
allow bankruptcy courts wide jurisdiction. 1 25 The court noted these reasons in adopting the aggregate contacts analysis because it felt that such
an analysis was fair and reasonable when examining whether an alien defendant was subject to federal court jurisdiction, even absent specific statutory authority.

126

Despite substantial inquiry into the subject, the Ace Pecan court bla127
tantly failed to follow precedent or appropriate statutory guidelines.
The court, relying only upon a combination of case dicta and vague policy
arguments, disregarded the statutory threshold for ascertaining personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident alien defendant. 128 Even after the court
acknowledged explicitly that Rule 7004(e) offered no such statutory authority in bankruptcy proceedings, 2 9 the Ace Pecan court proceeded to
apply the aggregate contacts test. 130 Had the court properly followed
legal, instead of policy arguments, it would have analyzed the sufficiency
119. Id. (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1238-39 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981)).
120. 930 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1991).
121. Diversity jurisdiction grants the district courts jurisdiction where the amount in
controversy is greater than $50,000, and is between citizens of different states, or of foreign
states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).

122. Federal question jurisdiction grants the district courts "original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
123. Ace Pecan, 143 B.R. at 701 (quoting United Rope Distributors,930 F.2d at 535).

124. Id. at 701.
125. Id. (refusing to ignore Congress' intent behind the nationwide service of process
provision).
126. Id. at 700-01. The court noted that fairness and reasonableness were key considerations. Id. at 701.
127. See id. at 698-701 (discussing at length both applicable statutory and case law).

128. See id. at 700-701 (relying on "persuasive reasons" set forth by courts and commentators for using aggregate contacts).
129. See id. at 699 ("No federal statute authorizes service on [the] foreign defendants
. . I. .
130. See id. at 701.
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of the defendant's contacts with the state under the state's long-arm statIn contrast to the erroneous decisions in both Granfinanciera3 2
ute.1 3
and Ace Pecan,133 several courts have addressed the personal jurisdiction
13
standards in the context of foreign defendants in bankruptcy correctly. 1
The courts in Bonapfel v. Cascade Imperial Mills, Ltd., (In re All American of Ashburn, Inc.),135 R.M.R. Corp. v. Clare Bros. Ltd., (In re R.M.R.
Corp.),136 and Old Electric Inc. v. RCP Inc., (In re Old Electric, Inc.),137
for instance, have all engaged in an accurate, albeit superficial, analysis of
the issue. In All American, the plaintiff attempted to bring an adversary
proceeding against a foreign defendant, Cascade Imperial Mills. 38 Cascade argued that its contacts with the plaintiff in the state of Georgia
consisted of one shipment of goods and, therefore, did not amount to
"transacting business,'" as required to obtain jurisdiction under the
Georgia long-arm statute.' 39 In an analysis of the bankruptcy rules, the
court determined that the proper inquiry into the personal jurisdiction
dispute required application of the state long-arm statute.140 The court
surmised correctly that Rule 7004(e) contained the guiding language on
this procedural question when it noted that:
Subparagraph (C) of Rule 7004(e) . . . permits service in a foreign country whenever such service is authorized by applicable
federal or state law. There appears to be no federal statute authorizing foreign service of a preference complaint, and jurisdiction over [Cascade] could therefore be asserted only if service is
permitted by Georgia's long-arm statute. 4 '
Like the All American decision, in R.M.R. Corp. v. Clare Brothers Ltd.
(In re R.M.R. Corp.)142 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland used the defendant's contacts with the forum state to determine the
appropriateness of asserting personal jurisdiction.' 43 The plaintiff/debtor
131. See id. at 699-700.
132. 835 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir.), rev'd, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); see also supra notes 97-100 and
accompanying text (discussing Granfinanciera).
133. 143 B.R. 696 (1992); see also supra notes 101-31 and accompanying text (discussing
Ace Pecan).
134. See infra notes 135-51 and accompanying text (reviewing cases which properly address jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in a bankruptcy case).
135. 78 B.R. 355 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987).
136. 133 B.R. 759 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991).
137. 142 B.R. 189 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
138. All American, 78 B.R. at 356.
139. Id. at 357.
140. Id. The court was quick to note that its holding did not imply that foreign defendants could retain preferential transfers. Id.
141. Id. (citation omitted).
142. 133 B.R. 759 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991).
143. Id. at 762-64.
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brought a claim against a Canadian company to recover receivables. 144
Because the defendant denied meeting the minimum contact requirement
for doing business in Maryland, the company objected to the court's personal jurisdiction. 145 The court first determined that no federal statute
granted it jurisdiction.' 46 Consequently, the court then concluded that it
was only through applicable state law that it could obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant.14 7
In Old Electric Inc. v. RCP Inc. (In re Old Electric)148 the bankruptcy
court for the Northern District of Ohio also evaluated the intricate bankruptcy personal jurisdiction issues. In Old Electric, the debtor filed an
adversary proceeding against a foreign corporation to recover allegedly
preferential transfers.' 49 The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that
Rule 7004(d) was a 'statute' under FRCP 4(e) allowing service in Canada, 150 for fear it would improperly "transmute a rule authorizing nation51
wide service of process into a rule authorizing worldwide service.'
Fortunately, the decision of Lone Star Industries Inc. v. Compania
Naviera Perez Companc (In re New York Trap Rock) 152 provides an elaborate explanation for utilizing state contacts, not nationwide contacts, in
bankruptcy. In New York Trap Rock, the defendants moved to dismiss
the claim based on the court's lack of personal jurisdiction. 153 As a result
of the defendant's motion, the burden shifted to the plaintiff/debtor to
establish personal jurisdiction. 1 54 The court noted that Congress did not
intend to create worldwide service of process in bankruptcy cases because, otherwise, Congress would have enacted a bankruptcy provision
144. Id. at 759-60. The plaintiff was a Maryland corporation that manufactured motors.
Id. at 759.
145. Id. at 760 (asserting that the court must rely on the state long-arm statute).
146. Id. at 761 (declaring, "[tihis court finds that there is no federal statute which specifically authorizes service on the foreign Defendant in this adversary complaint").
147. Id. The court specifically rejected plaintiff's argument for an aggregate contacts
analysis. Id. at 764. The court applied the Maryland long-arm statute and ultimately concluded that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 765.
148. 142 B.R. 189 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
149. Id. at 189.
150. Id. at 190-92. The court differentiated the word "statute" from the word "rule."
Id. at 191.
151. Id. at 190. The court concluded that jurisdiction might be obtained via a state
long-arm statute. Id. at 192.
152. 155 B.R. 871 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 160 B.R. 876 (S.D.N.Y 1993), and aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 42 F.3d 747 (2d Cir. 1994).
153. Id. at 878 (noting lack of personal jurisdiction as one of the defendant's affirmative
defenses).
154. Id. at 885 (requiring debtor to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction).
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authorizing it.' 5 5 The court concluded that the defendant must be amenable to service of process under the New York long-arm statute in order
for the court to exercise jurisdiction because no federal statute granted it
jurisdiction to serve alien defendants.' 56 Thus, to be subject to the New
York Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction, the defendants must fall under
New York State's long-arm statute. 5 7
In Levant Line, S.A. v. Marine Enterprises Corp. (In re Levant Line,
S.A.),158 the only decision to consider bankruptcy personal jurisdiction
following the 1993 Amendments to FRCP Rule 4, the court dodged the
Rule 7004(e) jurisdictional issue by deciding that the defendant lacked
sufficient contacts with both New York and with the United States.' 59 In
analyzing bankruptcy personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant,
the court began by appropriately disregarding Rule 7004(d) as the governing precept, 160 relying instead on Rule 7004(e). 161 The court noted
correctly that subsection (C) of Rule 7004(e) was the only applicable provision.1 62 This subsection required the court to look either to a state
long-arm statute or to a federal statute to determine "whether a defendant is amenable to service. ,163 Because no federal statute was implicated,
64
the court, accordingly, focused on New York's long-arm statute)
The court observed that the state long-arm statute provided jurisdiction
over a defendant corporation "if that corporation is 'doing business' in
New York.' 1 65 To constitute "doing business" in New York "a corporation must be operating within New York with a fair measure of permanence and continuity.' 166 The Levant court analyzed the defendant
foreign corporation's contacts with New York and determined that the
155. Id. at 889; see supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (describing legislative intention based upon legislative acts).
156. New York Trap Rock, 155 B.R. at 887. The court granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 890.
157. Id. at 887. A basis for jurisdiction under New York's statute was to be transacting
business within New York. Id. See supra note 52.
158. 166 B.R. 221 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
159. See id. at 231, 233-34.
160. Id. at 229 (disregarding Rule 7004(d) because it governed service only in the
United States).
161. Id. (relying on Rule 7004(e) because it controlled service in foreign countries).
162. Id. The court found subsection (A) inapplicable because the defendant was a nondebtor, and (B) inapplicable because it contemplated property sufficient for in rem jurisdiction. Id.
163. Id. The court refers to either of these two statutory avenues absent the defendant
either being an inhabitant in the state or consenting to service. Id. at 230.
164. Id.; see also N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 301 (McKinney 1990) (stating New York's
long-arm requirements).
165. Levant, 166 B.R. at 230.
166. Id. (clarifying statutory requirements through the use of case law).
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defendant was not subject to its jurisdiction under the state's long-arm
statute. 167 After disqualifying service on the defendant pursuant to state
long-arm provisions, the court also considered whether the 1993 amend-

ment to FRCP 4 may have broadened the scope of inquiry when deter168
mining personal jurisdiction in matters requiring international service.
The court conducted an analysis under a broadened inquiry, but, concluding no change in its result on jurisdiction, ultimately refused to base its
holding on the amended rule. 69

III. A

PROPOSED STATUTORY MODIFICATION

As evidenced in Levant's dicta, the amended version of FRCP 4 can
alter the traditional personal jurisdiction analysis for federal courts. 171 In
particular, amended FRCP 4(k)(2) expands the federal judiciary's ability
to assert jurisdiction in federal question cases. 17 1 Rather than permit the
exercise of jurisdiction only when a defendant has adequate contacts with

the forum state, amended FRCP 4 allows courts to exercise jurisdiction
based upon nationwide contacts. 1 72 The amended rule addresses the concern that, because of differing jurisdictional standards under various state
long-arm statutes, a foreign defendant could be amenable to process in
one state but not another, despite having the same contacts with both
states. 1 73 FRCP 4 creates a federal long-arm statute, which, in effect,
should prevent such inconsistencies. 4
167. Id. at 230-33.
168. Id. at 233. The Levant court examined the implications of such an expanded authority under the federal rules. Id.
169. Id. at 233-34 (stating, "[e]ven applying the broader test, I do not find that [the
foreign defendant] purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the United States").
170. See id. at 233 (explaining that the amended rule may allow for worldwide service,
absent analysis under state requirements for jurisdiction, where the foreign defendant has
minimum national contacts); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
171. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2); see also Holly A. Ellencrig, Comment, Expanding
PersonalJurisdiction Over Foreign Defendants: A Response to Omni Capital International
v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 363, 363-64 (1994) (discussing expanded
jurisdiction of the court in federal question cases).
172. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) ("If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, [service is effective] ... with respect to claims
arising under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction" of state courts); see also Comment C4-35, supra
note 54 (commenting on the new federal long-arm statute).
173. See Ellencrig, supra note 171, at 368-69 (discussing arbitrariness in the application
of federal law when using state long-arm statutes to establish jurisdiction).
174. See Comment C4-35, supra note 54 (noting that FRCP 4(k)(2) becomes effective
when the defendant has had sufficient contacts on a national level under long-arm analysis); Ellencrig, supra note 171, at 369 (predicting uniformity).
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Beyond the dicta in Levant interpreting Rule 7004(e) under amended
FRCP 4,175 the likely impact of the amendment remains uncertain. Accordingly, this Article recommends that the Bankruptcy Rules be revised
to enact a provision espousing worldwide service of process in bankruptcy
cases. Because bankruptcy court jurisdiction relies upon federal question
jurisdiction,'1 76 a worldwide service of process provision would not conflict with or overbroaden amended FRCP 4.177 Amending the Bankruptcy Rules in a manner consistent with amended FRCP 4 would serve
the admirable goals enunciated in the Ace Pecan decision: (1) the assur178
ance that bankruptcy court jurisdiction be exercised to its fullest scope;
and (2) the need for federal jurisdictional in bankruptcy cases to be ad79
dressed uniformly.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

The present version of Rule 7004 is inadequate to serve process on
foreign entities who lack a domestic presence. The text of this rule indicates clearly that analysis under the state long-arm statute is the most
appropriate method for determining bankruptcy personal jurisdiction
over foreign defendants. Although some courts have misconstrued the
Bankruptcy Rule on this issue, the amendments to FRCP 4 have vast
implications on traditional interpretation of international bankruptcy jurisdiction. The new amendments to FRCP 4 create a federal long-arm
statute in federal question cases. This empowers a court to assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants under a nationwide minimum contacts test,
if such contacts are insufficient for jurisdiction under the state's long-arm
statute. To avoid confusion about the full scope of amended FRCP 4, to
align the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Bankruptcy, and to prevent foreign defendants from being immune to suit, Congress should
amend the Bankruptcy Rules to allow bankruptcy courts a broader ability
to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants.

175. See supra notes 170-72; Levant Line, S.A. v. Marine Enter. Corp. (In re Levant
Line, S.A.), 166 B.R. at 221,233 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (explaining that the amended rule
may allow for worldwide service, absent analysis under state requirements for jurisdiction,
where foreign defendant has minimum national contacts); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
176. See Levant, 166 B.R. at 229 (clarifying the fact that a bankruptcy judge has authority under federal question jurisdiction).
177. See supra note 174; see also Comment C4-35, supra note 54 (commenting on the
new federal long-arm statute).
178. Ace Pecan Co., Inc. v. Granadex Int'l Ltd., (In re Ace Pecan Co., Inc.), 143 B.R.
696, 701 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1992).
179. Id.

